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Abstract: This paper deals with the collective action dilemma of antibiotic resistance. Despite 
the collective threat posed by antibiotic resistance, there are limited incentives for individuals to 
consider the contribution of their decisions to use antibiotics to the spread of resistance. Drawing 
on a novel survey of Swedish citizens (n=1,906), we study factors linked to i) willingness to 
accept a physician’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics and ii) willingness to limit personal use 
of antibiotics voluntary. In our study, 53 percent of the respondents stated that they would be 
willing to accept the physician’s decision despite disagreeing with it, and trust in the healthcare 
sector is significantly associated with acceptance. When it comes to people’s willingness to 
voluntarily abstain from using antibiotics, a majority stated that they are willing or very willing 
not to take antibiotics. The variation in willingness is best explained by concerns about antibiotic 
resistance and experience of antibiotic therapy, especially if a respondent has been denied 
antibiotics. Generalized trust seems to be unrelated to willingness to abstain, but the perception 
that other people limit their personal use of antibiotics is linked to respondents’ own willingness 
to do so. Few of the individual characteristics can explain the variation in that decision. 
Keywords: collective action, antibiotics use, antibiotic resistance, willingness to abstain 
JEL classification: D90, I12 
Acknowledgments: Financial support from the Center for Antibiotic Resistance Research, Foundation for 
Economic Research in West Sweden and the Center for Collective Action Research is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
                                                 
a Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 
b Center for Antibiotic Resistance Research (CARe), University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 
c Centre for Collective Action Research (CeCAR), University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 
d Department of Infectious Diseases, Institute of Biomedicine, Sahlgrenska Academy, University of Gothenburg, 
Gothenburg, Sweden 
e  Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 
f  The SOM Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 
* Corresponding author 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Many global challenges, such as climate change, resource depletion, and the spread of 
communicable diseases, are so-called collective action dilemmas. These are problems that can 
only be solved by large groups of people contributing to a common good and/or abstaining from 
harmful behavior. Collective action problems are often defined as situations where the gain for 
the collective is largest when everyone cooperates, while the gain for each individual actor is 
largest if he or she abstains from cooperating, disregarding all other actors’ behavior (Dawes 
1980). Nevertheless, it is well known that voluntary cooperation does frequently occur, especially 
in small- and medium-scale settings such as in the area of local resource extraction; scholars like 
Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1990, 2005, 2011) and Arun Agrawal (Agrawal 2001; Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999; Agrawal and Goyal 2001) have shown that such cooperation occurs and have 
explained why. Thus, the literature has identified a number of key factors that tend to increase the 
probability of cooperation, including group size, the delimitation of the resource, low degree of 
anonymity, high degree of public disclosure, possibilities for communication among actors, 
repeated interactions, possibilities for punishing unwanted behavior, and – in particular – trust 
(Dietz et al. 2002). Factors that have been found to decrease cooperation include the availability 
of a resource being perceived to be critically low and uncertainty about the state of a resource 
(Hine and Gifford 1996; Parks, Xu, and Van Lange 2017).  
Antibiotic resistance is a collective action dilemma. It is well known that use of antibiotics leads 
to the development of antibiotic resistance (Bronzwaer et al. 2002; Goossens et al. 2005). The 
more consumption there is, the less healing capacity remains. Antibiotic resistance is already 
causing hundreds of thousands of deaths annually and is predicted to increase radically in the 
future if it is not effectively counteracted (O’Neill 2014). At the same time, even for milder 
medical problems, people value their own time and are therefore eager to take medications that 
give them faster symptom relief and enable them to return to their normal activities as soon as 
possible (Wilson et al. 2004). The collective action problem of antibiotic resistance is therefore 
best described as a situation where prescribers and patients alike have no or only few reasons to 
take the global levels of resistance into account when making their consumption decisions, since 
the individual contribution is always comparably small (Laxminarayan and Heymann 2012; 
Rönnerstrand and Andersson Sundell 2015; Jørgensen et al. 2016; Tarrant et al. 2019).  
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Similar to other large-scale problems, such as climate change and marine plastic pollution, 
reduction of the problem of antibiotic resistance will require large-scale cooperation in terms of 
both geographical scope and number of actors (Nannestad 2008). Despite the large scale of the 
problems mentioned, and despite the limited impact one single individual can have on the 
outcome, we do know that some people voluntarily make certain sacrifices to contribute to 
reducing the negative impacts, i.e., they cooperate. Most scholarly attention in this context has 
been given to people’s willingness to reduce their own contribution to global climate changes, 
and researchers have found that voluntary sacrifices are typically correlated with a number of 
individual characteristics. For example, individuals with higher education tend to be more 
concerned about climate change and younger people are usually more willing to change their 
behavior related to climate change, while for example right-wing voters are less willing to take 
such actions (Semenza et al. 2008; Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012). Although to a much 
lesser extent, there are also studies focusing on people’s willingness to contribute to the reduction 
of antibiotic resistance. For example, a few studies have looked at the role of trust/reciprocity and 
people’s general willingness to postpone or abstain from using antibiotics (Rönnerstrand and 
Andersson Sundell 2015; Robertson, Jagers, and Rönnerstrand 2018). 
The focus of this study is individual collective action to limit antibiotic use. We explore the links 
between individual characteristics, past experiences of antibiotics use, knowledge about antibiotic 
resistance, and generalized and institutional trust and (i) the acceptability of a physician’s 
decision not to prescribe antibiotics and (ii) the willingness to abstain from using antibiotics for 
the common good. In doing so, the paper connects to the broad literature on collective action and 
voluntary provision of public goods.  
It is difficult to use observational data to study acceptability and voluntary collective action. A 
number of studies have used experiments to investigate cooperation, and then cooperation in 
smaller scale settings in the lab (Chaudhuri 2011). Field studies have focused on donations (Frey 
and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009) or resource use at the local level (Cardenas, Ahn, and 
Ostrom 2004; Velez, Stranlund, and Murphy 2009). Our interest is in large-scale settings, and we 
use a survey-based method where we construct scenarios and ask the respondents what they 
would do under those specific circumstances. Moreover, we carried out the study in Sweden, 
where both the level of knowledge about antibiotics is high (Vallin et al. 2016; 'Special 
Eurobarometer 445: antimicrobial resistance.'  2016) and antibiotics are solely available by 
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prescription. In addition, we explained the definition of antibiotic resistance in our survey. Our 
respondents were therefore aware of the link between antibiotics use and antibiotic resistance and 
knew that the availability of antibiotics is regulated by prescriptions from physicians. Since the 
frequency of prescriptions is already comparably low (i.e., we investigate the willingness to 
cooperate in a setting with a low level of unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics), choosing the 
case of Sweden can be seen as a critical case: If we find willingness to abstain from using 
antibiotics, one can probably expect even stronger willingness in countries where the current 
level antibiotic use is higher.  
We conducted a survey with a representative sample of the Swedish population. In the survey, we 
asked respondents how likely they would be to accept a physician’s decision not to prescribe 
antibiotics in a situation where they believe they actually need antibiotics. In addition, 
respondents were asked to state their willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics in a situation 
where this would prolong their sickness but not be lethal in any way. We also asked them about 
their expectations about how willing they believed other people would be to do the same. Finally, 
we also included questions to measure respondents’ institutional and generalized trust, their 
knowledge about antibiotic resistance, their health status, possible experiences of being denied 
antibiotics, as well as socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.  
Our empirical analyses reveal that trust in healthcare sector is positively associated with 
acceptability of a physician’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics, also when controlling for 
knowledge about antibiotic resistance and other potential confounders. Those who are worried 
about antibiotic resistance are also more willing to accept a doctor’s decision. However, our 
ability to explain the variation in the responses is limited. When it comes to willingness to 
abstain, we find that the variation in responses is mainly related to past experiences and concerns 
about antibiotic resistance. Individuals who have used antibiotics in the last year and those who 
have been denied antibiotics in the past are typically much less willing to abstain from taking 
antibiotics. We do not find that any form of trust affects the willingness to abstain from using 
antibiotics, while expectations about what others would do does have a certain effect. Thus, we 
argue that the belief of what others would do if confronted with the same situation as the 
respondents appears to be linked to cooperation through norms of reciprocity (Gächter and 
Herrmann 2009; Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Rönnerstrand and Andersson Sundell 2015) rather than 
trust per se.  
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The rest of the article is structured as follows: First, we describe antibiotics use in high-income 
countries and what factors have been shown to affect it. Second, we discuss the relationship 
between individual characteristics, experiences, trust and antibiotics use and behavior, followed 
by a description of previous research and mechanisms between generalized trust and individual 
cooperation to limit antibiotics use. In the subsequent section, our data and method are explained, 
followed by our results. Thereafter our findings are discussed. We end the article with some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2 Antibiotics use and individual behavior 
 
It is well-known that the consumption of antibiotics in high-income countries does not 
correspond to the frequency of bacterial infections. Instead, the levels of antibiotics use and/or 
antibiotic resistance are linked to a number of institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors. 
Institutional factors include type of healthcare system (Cars, Mölstad, and Melander 2001) and 
variables related to it, such as national recommendations, treatment traditions and pharmaceutical 
marketing (Bjerrum et al. 2004), and levels of corruption (Collignon et al. 2015; Collignon et al. 
2018; Rönnerstrand and Lapuente 2017). Examples of socioeconomic factors include economic 
inequality (Kirby and Herbert 2013), GDP per capita, and public spending on healthcare 
(Collignon et al. 2018). Uncertainty avoidance and masculinity norms have been identified as the 
most relevant cultural factors affecting antibiotics use in a country (Harbarth and Monnet 2008; 
Touboul-Lundgren et al. 2015; Borg 2012, 2014).  
There are also individual-level factors affecting personal consumption of antibiotics. In a study of 
the Swedish population, knowledge about antibiotic resistance has been linked to more 
appropriate use of antibiotics (Vallin et al. 2016). However, the results from prior studies are 
partly inconclusive. Another study found that better knowledge is linked to higher stated 
frequency of self-medication with left-over antibiotics (McNulty et al. 2007). The same two 
studies found a link between low education and lower commitment to prudent antibiotic use and 
higher consumption of antibiotics. A systematic review of gender differences in the prevalence of 
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antibiotic treatment found women to be treated with antibiotics to a larger extent than men 
(Schröder et al. 2016).  
Since overconsumption is a key reason for the accelerated growth of antibiotic resistance, there is 
an upsurge in regulations intended to reduce antibiotics use through antibiotic stewardship 
programs in inpatient and outpatient care (Sanchez 2016; Barlam et al. 2016). A majority of 
countermeasures are directed to medical practitioners, for example through education and 
implementation of treatment guidelines to reduce their prescription of antibiotics (Mölstad et al. 
2002; Mueller and Östergren 2016). But since patients are known to influence the decision-
making by healthcare staff (Bradley 1992a, 1992b; McNulty et al. 2013; Mangione-Smith et al. 
2004), attention is now also being given to efforts to change the behavior and attitudes of the 
general public. Information campaigns focusing on prudent use of antibiotics is one example 
(Huttner et al. 2010).  
However, although an increase in the public’s knowledge and awareness of antibiotic use and its 
link to resistance is likely to be necessary in order for behavioral and attitudinal change to occur, 
it can hardly get the job done alone. At least, this has been a theoretical point of departure in 
many models of collective action, ever since the seminal work by Hardin (Hardin 1968). 
Furthermore, the fact that the use of antibiotics is correlated with individual-level characteristics, 
attitudes or knowledge, does not necessarily mean that such factors are also correlated with 
people’s willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics. We therefore investigate whether factors 
such as individual characteristics, past experiences, knowledge and concerns about antibiotic 
resistance, and generalized and institutional trust are linked to people’s willingness to abstain 
from taking antibiotics and to accept a doctor’s decision not to prescribe. 
In regard to larger-scale problems, research also points to the importance of trust. High levels of 
generalized and institutional trust are argued to promote stability and effectiveness of a number 
of societal processes, including support of and compliance with a range of policies (Braithwaite 
and Levi 1998; Lubell and Scholz 2001). Trust has also been found to matter for health systems, 
and trust-based health systems in its turn can build value to a society (Gilson 2003). Although 
highly correlated, the mechanism at work when it comes to generalized and institutional trust 
differ. Generalized trust is argued to stimulate voluntary cooperation while institutional trust 
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upholds confidence in information from authorities and acceptance of their decisions (Braithwaite 
and Levi 1998; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002). 
Although some prior studies discuss trust as potentially important for levels of antibiotic use 
(Nguyen 2011; Touboul-Lundgren et al. 2015; Deschepper et al. 2008), rather few empirically 
test whether this is in fact the case. Touboul-Lundgren et al. measure trust in physicians as an 
integrated part of their measure of culture, and show that practitioners are worried about losing 
patients’ trust if they do not prescribe antibiotics. This is important since patients’ expectations 
have previously been found to affect antibiotic prescription behavior (Stivers 2005). In a survey 
study on public knowledge and awareness related to antibiotics and antibiotic resistance in 
Sweden, André et al. (2010) found that when given a choice between a doctor who prescribed 
antibiotics and one who did not, more respondents reported trusting the latter. Similarly, Vallin 
and co-authors (2016) found that while 89 percent of their respondents had confidence in doctors 
who did prescribe antibiotics also as many as 79 percent had confidence in physicians who 
decided not to prescribe antibiotics. There are a few studies looking at the influence of trust and 
people’s general willingness to postpone or abstain from using antibiotics (Rönnerstrand and 
Andersson Sundell 2015; Robertson, Jagers, and Rönnerstrand 2018). Rönnerstrand and 
Andersson Sundell found reciprocity and generalized trust to be positively correlated with 
individuals’ willingness to postpone antibiotics treatment. Similarly, Robertson et al. showed that 
generalized trust is an important channel for explaining willingness to abstain from using 
antibiotics. In addition to generalized trust, we also investigate trust in healthcare as well as 
beliefs, i.e., expectations, about others’ willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics. Moreover, 
and further discussed in the design section, we frame the willingness not to take antibiotics 
question such that there is real trade-off for the respondents between not taking the antibiotics 
and getting well sooner by taking them.  
 
3 Survey design and data 
 
The survey was administered to respondents (18–75 years old) through the Citizen Panel 
(Martinsson et al., 2018), which is an online panel survey administered by the Laboratory of 
Opinion Research (LORE) at the Faculty of Social Science, University of Gothenburg, in 
Sweden. The survey was conducted from March 22 to April 16 in 2018 and resulted in a total of 
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1,906 responses. The participation rate for the survey panel was 55.4 percent. To better mirror the 
Swedish population, the sample was stratified by education, age, and gender.  
The survey consisted of four parts. The first part contained questions about the respondent’s 
contact with the healthcare sector and use of antibiotics. The second part contained knowledge-
questions about antibiotics and antibiotic resistance. In the third part, respondents were asked 
about their levels of generalized trust and trust in various institutions, including healthcare sector. 
Finally, the last part contained questions about the respondent’s demographics and socio-
economic status. 
3.1 Dependent variables 
Two separate indicators of preparedness for collective action to limit antibiotic resistance were 
used: Acceptability of the physician’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics and willingness to 
abstain from taking antibiotics. In order to measure the willingness to abstain from taking 
antibiotics in a situation where this would not cause any serious threats to the individual, we 
asked the following question:  
“For a number of bacterial infections, for example tonsillitis, we know that the use of antibiotics 
will quicken your recovery. If you do not take antibiotics, you will continue to be ill for several 
additional days. How willing or unwilling are you to abstain from using antibiotics when 
possible, even if it means that you will be sick for some extra days?”  
Respondents were told to answer on a scale from 1 (very willing) to 5 (very unwilling). In order 
to measure acceptability of a physician’s decision, we asked the following question:  
“If a doctor would not prescribe antibiotics, even if you were sure that you needed them, how 
would you react?”g The following response alternatives were given (the respondents could mark 
several): (i) I would accept it, (ii) I would try to convince the doctor to prescribe antibiotics, (iii) I 
would be upset, but not say anything, (iv) I would contact another doctor, (v) I would ask for 
advice from a doctor I know, and (vi) other.  
Respondents who choose option (i) are identified as “willing to accept the decision.”  
 
                                                 
g It could of course be brought into question whether patients really can be “sure” that they need antibiotics, but the 
question is designed to target the perceptions of patients and not medical realities. 
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3.2 Independent variables  
The final part of the survey consisted of questions regarding demographic and socioeconomic 
factors such as age, gender, education, place of residence, children, income, and self-rated health 
status.  
The first part of the survey contained a set of questions about the use of antibiotics in the past 12 
months, whether the respondents had visited a doctor in the past 12 months, and whether they had 
been denied antibiotics one or several times (despite them believing that they needed them). The 
survey also included a set of questions intended to measure the respondents’ knowledge about 
antibiotics and antibiotic resistance. The variable consists of an index based on four knowledge 
questions. Respondents were asked to identify whether the following statements are correct: (i) 
antibiotics are effective against viruses, (ii) if I have bronchitis I will get well sooner with 
antibiotics, (iii) antibiotics negatively affect the body’s natural bacterial flora, (iv) bacteria can be 
resistant to antibiotics, and (v) the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry may eventually affect 
the effectiveness of antibiotics in humans. In addition, we asked to what extent respondents 
worried about antibiotic resistance on a 1–4 scale, where 4 corresponded to the highest level of 
concern.   
Regarding trust, the survey included a question on generalized trust, reading “In your opinion, to 
what extent can people in general be trusted?” The respondents answered this question on a 0–10 
scale, where 0=”You cannot trust people” and 10=”You can trust people.” We also asked about 
their trust in healthcare sector and the doctor(s) at their own healthcare center. Here the response 
alternatives ranged from 1 (very high trust) to 6 (very low trust). In order to investigate whether 
perceptions about other people’s willingness to reduce their consumption of antibiotics mediate 
the relationship between generalized trust and own willingness to limit use, we asked the 
following question: “How willing or unwilling do you think other people are to abstain from 
using antibiotics when possible, even if it means a few extra sick days?” The respondents were 
again told to answer on a scale from 1 (very willing) to 5 (very unwilling).  
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4 Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. A large share of the respondents had visited a 
doctor at least once and 20 percent had taken antibiotics at least once, in the past 12 months. 
Overall, the subjectively rated health status of the respondents is good, with a mean value of 
almost 4 (on a 1–5 scale). The level of knowledge about antibiotics is high, with a mean value of 
0.77, meaning that the number of correct answers is close to 4 out of 5. There is also a 
considerable level of concern about antibiotic resistance. Overall, the level of trust is high with an 
average level of generalized trust of almost 7 (on a 0–10 scale), and the level of trust in 
healthcare and the doctor(s) at one’s own healthcare center is also high (3.8 on a 1–5 scale).h,i 
Comparing with official statistics for Sweden, we can see that our sample is representative with 
respect to gender and education, but there is a certain overrepresentation of older respondents.  
                                                 
h Figure A1 in the appendix shows the full distribution of responses to the question on generalized trust.  
i The fact that both the self-rated health status and trust in healthcare are high in our sample is in line with the 
findings by Mohseni and Lindström (2007), who found that low trust in the healthcare system is related to poor self-
perceived health.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  
Statistics 
of 
Sweden 
Female =1 if respondent is female 0.480 0.499 
Older = If respondent is ≥60 years 0.291 0.198 
Young = if respondent is <40 years 0.293  
University =1 if university education ≥ 3 years.  0.263 0.270 
Large city =1 if respondent lives in one of the 3 biggest cities in Sweden 0.386 
 
Has child =1 if respondent has children < 11 years 0.185  
Work =1 if working full time 0.633  
Income =household income after taxes in SEK 10,000 4.067 (2.173) 
 
Visit doctor =1 if visited a doctor at least once in the last 12 months 0.710 
 
Taken antibiotics =1 if taken antibiotics at least once in the last 12 months 0.200 
 
Refused antibiotics = 1 if having not received antibiotics despite actually needing them 0.131 
 
Health status Rating of own health status on the 1–5 scale, where 5 is very good 
3.909 
(0.853) 
 
Correct  Mean value of correct answers to 5 statements about antibiotic usage 
0.769 
(0.082) 
 
Worry resistance Level of concern about resistance on a 1–4 scale, where 4 means highest level of concern.  
3.090 
(0.982) 
 
Generalized trust Rating of general trust on 0–10 scale, where 10 is very high trust 
6.862 
(1.980) 
 
Trust healthcare Rating of trust in healthcare sector in general on a 1–5 scale, where 5 is very high trust. 
3.752 
(0.919) 
 
Trust own doctor Rating of trust in doctor at own healthcare center on 1–5 scale, where 5 is very high trust 
3.660 
(1.016 
 
Accept decision = 1 if respondent would accept doctor’s decision despite belief that antibiotics should be prescribed 0.528 
 
N Number of observations 1,869  
 
A majority, 53 percent, of the sample would accept a decision by a doctor not to prescribe 
antibiotics, despite disagreeing.j Table 2 presents responses to our two main questions regarding 
willingness not to take antibiotics. The first question concerned own willingness and the second 
the perceived willingness of others. 
 
  
                                                 
j Vallin et al. (2016) also conducted a study in Sweden and found that over 79 percent of their respondents had 
confidence in decisions by doctors not to prescribe antibiotics. However, they did not inquire about the respondents’ 
acceptance in cases where the respondents believed they really needed antibiotics.  
12 
 
Table 2. Distribution of responses to question on willingness not to take antibiotics 
 Self Others 
Very unwilling 5% 12% 
Unwilling 15% 52% 
Neither willing nor unwilling  15% 20% 
Willing 35% 14% 
Very willing 30% 2% 
Number of obs. 1,869 1,869 
 
A majority stated that they are willing or very willing not to take antibiotics, while only 16 
percent thought that others are willing or very willing. Furthermore, 20 percent are unwilling or 
very unwilling to abstain from using antibiotics, while the same fraction is 64 percent when the 
question concerns other people’s willingness. The correlation coefficient between the responses 
to the two questions is around 0.36. The difference in response distributions is statistically 
significant at the 1% level using a sign-rank test, indicating a clear difference between the two 
questions. Thus, there is a large difference between what respondents think they would do 
personally and what they think other people would do. At the individual level, this might be 
correct of course, but in total a rather large share of the respondents are either over-estimating 
their own willingness not to take antibiotics or under-estimating others’ willingness not to take 
antibiotics. The phenomenon of trusting one’s own ability to make decisions relates to the 
literature on overconfidence (Moore and Healy 2008; Benoît and Dubra 2011; Benoît et al. 
2015). In the overconfidence literature, a person’s belief that his or her own judgment is better 
than other people’s judgment is known as overconfidence or illusionary superiority if person´s 
beliefs are identified as biased. Bias occurs if more than half of the population believes that their 
behavior or decisions are better than those of half of the population. 
 
Our interest, however, is not primarily in the exact levels of the responses to the two questions. 
Instead, we are interested in the variation in responses across individuals and in the correlation 
and relative difference between the responses to the two questions. Thus, even if there is an 
element of overconfidence in the responses, we will assume that an individual who claims to be 
very willing is actually more willing to abstain than one who claims to be, for example, 
unwilling.  
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4.2 Regression analysis 
In the main text we focus on how factors correlate with the two main questions of interest, i.e., 
concerning (i) the likelihood of accepting the decision of a physician and (ii) the willingness to 
abstain from taking antibiotics, respectively. In Table A1 in the appendix, we report regression 
models for stated trust (both generalized and trust in healthcare sector) and for expectations about 
other people’s willingness not to take antibiotics.k  
Acceptance of a doctor’s decision is a binary variable, equal to one if a respondent accepts and 
zero if not, but we report results from a standard ordinary least square regression.l We first 
estimate a model with socio-economic characteristics only. In the second model, we add variables 
relating to experience and knowledge regarding antibiotics and antibiotic resistance, and finally, 
in the third model we also include trust and expected willingness of others. The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
  
                                                 
k Generalized trust is correlated with a number of individual characteristics. Females and university educated have 
higher levels of trust, trust increases with income, and younger people have a lower level of trust. In addition, trust 
increases with self-reported health status. Stated trust in the healthcare sector is not correlated with as many 
individual characteristics, but it is positively correlated with being older, income, and health status, and in addition, 
those who have been refused antibiotics have a lower level of trust in the healthcare sector. The stated willingness of 
others to abstain from taking antibiotics is correlated with age: those who are older have higher beliefs about other 
people’s willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics. Moreover, the stated willingness of others to abstain is 
negatively correlated with a high knowledge about correct antibiotics usage and positively correlated with 
generalized trust. 
l Results from a binary probit model give similar results. These are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3. Regression models for acceptance of doctor’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Older 0.076* 0.050 0.040 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Young -0.024 -0.040 -0.033 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
University -0.021 -0.037 -0.046 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Large city -0.036 -0.038 -0.034 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Work -0.019 -0.019 -0.012 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Income -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.0061) (0.006) (0.006) 
No response income -0.060 -0.033 -0.031 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) 
Has child -0.018 -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Visit doctor  0.018 0.014 
  (0.027) (0.027) 
Taken antibiotics  -0.055 -0.055 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
Refused antibiotics  -0.160*** -0.137*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) 
Correct  0.047 0.011 
  (0.147) (0.146) 
Worry resistance  0.032* 0.030* 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
Health status  0.018 0.002 
  (0.014) (0.015) 
Trust healthcare   0.075*** 
   (0.014) 
Generalized trust   0.009 
   (0.006) 
Others’ willingness to 
abstain 
  -0.003 
   (0.013) 
Constant 0.577*** 0.417** 0.188 
 (0.036) (0.130) (0.139) 
Observations 1,869 1,786 1,786 
R-squared 0.013 0.032 0.053 
      Note: Significant at * 5%, ** 1%, and *** 0.1% 
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The willingness to accept a doctor’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics despite disagreeing is 
not to any large extent correlated with any of the individual characteristics we observe. Older 
respondents are more likely to accept the decision, but the effect is small and the coefficient is 
only statistically significant at the 5% level.m In the next model, we add experiences and 
knowledge regarding antibiotics and antibiotic resistance. Being concerned about antibiotic 
resistance increases the likelihood of accepting a no-prescription decision. The effect size is not 
very large; a one standard deviation increase in concern increases the likelihood of accepting a 
no-prescription decision by 0.02 units. However, experience of having been refused antibiotics in 
the past, despite own belief that antibiotics were needed, decreases the acceptance of the decision 
by 0.16 units. In the third model, we add the two measures of trust. Interestingly, generalized 
trust is not statistically significantn, while trust in healthcare sector is. However, the size of the 
effect is not very large; a one standard deviation increase in trust in healthcare (0.92) increases 
the likelihood of accepting a no-prescription decision by 0.07 units (the average value of the 
probability of accepting the decision is 0.53). Thus, in general, we cannot explain the variation in 
acceptability of a no-prescription decision. All three models have a low explanatory power, and 
the effect sizes are small.  
Next, we estimate models for the willingness to abstain from using antibiotics in a case of non-
fatal infection but where antibiotics would decrease the number of sick days. The stated own 
willingness to abstain variable has five categories (1 = very unwilling and 5 = very willing), but 
we report results from standard ordinary least squares regressions.o  
  
                                                 
m As shown in Table 1, we have overrepresentation of older respondents in the sample. However, the significant but 
small impact of being older disappears in models 2 and 3 with more controls. Therefore, we are not worried that this 
overrepresentation has affected our results to any significant extent. 
n Veenstra (2000) also found that general trust was unrelated to self-reported health status, but an association 
between trust and self-reported mental health has been found in for example  Lindström and Mohseni (2009). 
o We have also estimated ordered probit models, but we report results from standard regressions since the results are 
very similar and the interpretation of the results is more straightforward. Results from ordered probit models are 
available from the authors upon request. 
16 
 
Table 4. Regression models for stated willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.054 -0.073 -0.042 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.051) 
Older -0.023 -0.066 -0.107 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.065) 
Young 0.089 0.025 0.119 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.063) 
University -0.008 -0.066 -0.109 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.060) 
Large city -0.138* -0.141* -0.106* 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.051) 
Work -0.025 -0.061 -0.041 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.060) 
Income -0.009 -0.017 -0.023 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
No response income -0.079 -0.009 -0.041 
 (0.142) (0.137) (0.127) 
Has child 0.051 0.071 0.077 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.069) 
Visit doctor  -0.094 -0.103 
  (0.062) (0.057) 
Taken antibiotics  -0.228*** -0.248*** 
  (0.068) (0.063) 
Refused antibiotics  -0.603*** -0.531*** 
  (0.079) (0.073) 
Correct  -0.372 -0.111 
  (0.330) (0.307) 
Worry resistance  0.285*** 0.276*** 
  (0.028) (0.026) 
Health status  0.097** 0.096** 
  (0.032) (0.031) 
Trust healthcare   0.029 
   (0.029) 
Generalized trust   0.005 
   (0.014) 
Others’ willingness to abstain   0.451*** 
   (0.027) 
Constant 3.816*** 3.152*** 1.722*** 
 (0.089) (0.293) (0.292) 
Observations 1,869 1,786 1,786 
R-squared 0.006 0.111 0.240 
Note: Significant at * 5%, ** 1%, and *** 0.1% 
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In the first model with only individual characteristics, living in a large city is the only one that is 
significantly associated with willingness to abstain from using antibiotics. Thus, again we are 
unable to explain the variation in responses with individual characteristics. We then add 
experience and knowledge variables. Almost all characteristics related to own health status and 
recent experience with healthcare are statistically significant: worse health status, recent use of 
antibiotics, being denied antibiotics in the past, low level of concern about resistance, and lower 
health status are all associated with a lower willingness to abstain. Having been denied antibiotics 
has the largest effect: the willingness decreases by 0.6 units (mean value of the stated willingness 
is 3.7) if a respondent has been denied antibiotics in the situation where he or she believed they 
were needed. Past use of antibiotics is relatively important as well: the willingness to abstain is 
0.2 units lower if the person has used antibiotics in the last 12 months. Finally, those who are 
concerned about antibiotic resistance are clearly more likely to state they would not take 
antibiotics. 
Next, we look at what happens if we include both of the stated trust variables and expectation 
about other people’s willingness to abstain from using antibiotics. Interestingly, neither of the 
stated trust variables is statistically significant, while expectation about what others would do is, 
and the effect is sizeable. An increase by one standard deviation in expectation variable (0.93) 
increases the stated willingness by 0.47 units (the mean value of the stated own willingness to 
abstain is 3.7). Clearly, expectation about others and trust may be correlated. However, if we 
estimate the model without expectation about others, personal trust is still not statistically 
significant, although the size of the coefficient increases.  
 
5 Discussion 
We set out to investigate whether people accept a doctor’s decision not to prescribe antibiotics 
despite disagreeing and whether people’s willingness to abstain from taking antibiotics can be 
explained by trust, individual characteristics, and experience and knowledge regarding antibiotics 
and antibiotic resistance.  
We found that a substantial fraction of the respondents reported to be willing to accept a doctor’s 
decision not to prescribe antibiotics. Even though this issue is potentially sensitive to social 
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desirability and hence over-reporting of compliant behavior, our finding is important not least in 
light of the existence of other sources of antibiotics available to patients who are disappointed 
with doctors’ decisions not to prescribe antibiotics, such as leftover supplies from previous 
prescriptions, online pharmacies, and simply other doctors. High acceptability of doctors’ no-
prescription decisions is also important because it signifies that even in a low-prescribing setting, 
such as in Sweden, a strict antibiotics policy may be supported by the Swedish people. (André et 
al. 2010; Vallin et al. 2016). In a study by André and colleges, high acceptability of physicians’ 
decision of not prescribing antibiotics was found. However, the rate of prescriptions of antibiotics 
decreased substantially after the sampling of data (2006) in the study by André et al. and 
continued to decrease also after the data sampling (2013) in Vallin et al (Swedres-Swarm 2017). 
It is questionable whether these results are valid today in the new low-prescribing setting, and 
this highlights the importance of repeated large-scale surveys like ours.  
Intriguingly, we have a hard time explaining acceptability of a doctor’s decision. A few of the 
individual characteristics and experiences are statistically significant, but with small effect sizes. 
The factors significantly associated with acceptability of a doctor’s decisions include trust in the 
healthcare system. This finding fits well with prior studies investigating the link between 
institutional trust and health-related collective action problems, such as vaccinations 
(Rönnerstrand 2013) and other protective measures to limit the spread of transferable diseases 
(Chuang et al. 2015). As Ancilotti et al. (2018) point out, patients often trust their own healthcare 
centers and rely on proper information about antibiotic resistance and why antibiotics are not 
needed in some situations. If a patient perceives that the information is not accurate, his or her 
trust in and acceptance of a doctor’s decision is likely to diminish. Trust in the healthcare system 
is thus conditional not only on decisions on antibiotic prescriptions but also on information 
provided by healthcare workers.  
The willingness to abstain from using antibiotics is rather strongly correlated with experience and 
concerns about resistance. Again, individual characteristics do not explain the variation in 
responses. Interestingly, we did not find generalized or institutional trust to be correlated with 
willingness to abstain from using antibiotics. This contradicts what has been demonstrated in 
other studies on antibiotic use (Robertson, Jagers, and Rönnerstrand 2018; Rönnerstrand and 
Andersson Sundell 2015). One possible explanation for the lack of association between 
institutional trust in the healthcare sector and willingness to limit one’s use of antibiotics might 
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be that this kind of trust makes people more inclined to believe that antibiotic resistance is a 
problem that can be effectively resolved by the healthcare system, and hence that voluntary 
behavioral change by individuals is unnecessary. However, the importance of expectations about 
what others would do suggests that the willingness to abstain from antibiotics is linked to 
cooperation through norms of reciprocity (Gächter and Herrmann 2009; Fehr and Schmidt 2006). 
This is in line with prior scenario-experimental results (Rönnerstrand and Andersson Sundell 
2015). 
Thus, while we find that individuals in this study are willing to take action to reduce the use of 
antibiotics and to accept a doctor’s decisions not to prescribe, we cannot explain the determinants 
behind the behavior to any large extent. This means that our paper provides little guidance on 
how to increase the likelihood of voluntary cooperation. It still remains an open question whether 
there are other factors that can explain the variation to a larger degree. Future research may 
further explore the potential link between personality types and attitudes and behavior related to 
antibiotic use (Axelsson 2013). Also, patient´s experience of expecting a prescription of 
antibiotics, but being refused, should be examined in settings with low rates of antibiotic 
prescriptions. Otherwise a judicious use of antibiotics may suffer setbacks. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1. Histogram, generalized trust (0 = You cannot trust people in general, …., 10 = You 
can trust people in general) 
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Table A1. Regression models, generalized trust, trust in healthcare, and stated willingness 
of others to abstain 
 Generalized trust Trust in 
healthcare 
Willingness of 
others 
(4) 
Female 0.249** -0.068 -0.067 -0.077 
 (0.092) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) 
Older 0.057 0.140* 0.081 0.075 
 (0.119) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) 
Young -0.361** -0.061 -0.200*** -0.181** 
 (0.114) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) 
University 0.518*** 0.068 0.086 0.059 
 (0.108) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) 
Large city 0.085 -0.070 -0.076 -0.078 
 (0.094) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) 
Work -0.084 -0.088 -0.038 -0.032 
 (0.109) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
Income 0.083*** 0.027* 0.009 0.004 
 (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
No response income -0.258 0.009 0.073 0.085 
 (0.233) (0.110) (0.115) (0.114) 
Have child -0.113 0.040 -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.126) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) 
Have visit doctor -0.0607 0.062 0.016 0.017 
 (0.104) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051) 
Taken antibiotics -0.059 0.013 0.043 0.046 
 (0.116) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
Refused antibiotics -0.241 -0.285*** -0.138* -0.119 
 (0.133) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
Correct 1.100* 0.337 -0.612* -0.674* 
 (0.560) (0.265) (0.276) (0.275) 
Worry resistance 0.130** 0.012 0.016 0.009 
 (0.047) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Health status 0.444*** 0.158*** -0.013 -0.038 
 (0.055) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Generalized trust    0.049*** 
    (0.012) 
Trust healthcare    0.024 
    (0.026) 
Constant 3.515*** 2.795*** 2.951*** 2.712*** 
 (0.497) (0.235) (0.245) (0.254) 
Observations 1,786 1,786 1,786 1,786 
R-squared 0.106 0.056 0.024 0.035 
Note: Dependent variables are categorical: generalized trust (0 = You cannot trust people in general, …., 10 = You 
can trust people in general), trust in healthcare sector (0=very low trust, …, 4=very high trust), and stated willingness 
of others to abstain from not taking antibiotics (1 = very unwilling, and 5 = very willing). Results are reported for 
ordinary least squares. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%, and *** 0.1%. 
